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This paper illustrates the complexities involved with the 
tasks necessary to ensure safe operations for flight missions 
based on International Space Station (ISS) operations
experience and other researched material. The experience is
derived from Safety and Mission Assurance Operations on 
the safety console in the ISS Mission Evaluation Room.  The 
focus is on roles played by operations engineers in executing
strict flight product verification through phases of 
Implementation Verification, Certification of Flight 
Readiness, and Visiting Vehicle Operations.  The paper
highlights the manner in which operations engineers help to 
ensure safety and mission success through application of 
systems engineering and project management principles.
Prior to the system performing its function, the system engineering 
& project management processes begin with the “top-down 
development” of processes & phases to be applied to each 
project/flight/mission which are in-line with recommended 
practices [1, 3]. With approved/ established processes/phases the 
S&MA Ops Engineers perform “bottoms-up integration and 
verification” through use of the available resources to the 
appropriate level of technical depth during the respective 
timeframe allotted for each project/flight/mission. The system 
engineering process is used on each level with control gate 
(review) before proceeding to develop the next lower level of 
problem and solution descriptions. The output (requirements 
baseline) at each level is the input to start the next level (iteration). 
In some instances the S&MA Ops Engineer will perform reviews 
with customers and stakeholders to confirm the need and obtain 
concurrence on interim solutions. Reports & assessments continue 
to move up the management chain at successively bigger picture 
combinations of solutions (integration) that have been tested 
(verified).
The INCOSE Handbook version 2a [1] defines Systems 
Engineering as the interdisciplinary approach and means to enable 
the realization of successful systems. There are several engineering 
disciplines such as: reliability, supportability, quality, human 
factors, risk management, safety, etc.  Safety is an extremely 
important engineering specialty within the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) and  a loss of crew is 
considered a catastrophic event.  Safety is not difficult to achieve 
when properly integrated from the beginning of each space 
systems project/mission planning.  The key is to ensure proper 
handling of safety verification throughout each flight/mission 
phase.  
Implementation Verification and CoFR are also performed for 
visiting vehicles with an additional step of observing export control 
laws.  Russia, Canada, Europe and Japan are established 
international partners due to the presence of their module(s), 
equipment and/or personnel that has been on the ISS.  The United 
States and our international partners have visiting vehicles that are 
used to transport/equip the ISS’s crew and to assemble/maintain the 
ISS.  The United States and Russia have human space flight 
vehicles – Space Shuttle Orbiter and Soyuz (respectively). Russia, 
Europe and Japan have successfully launched and docked/berthed 
automated cargo transfer vehicles to the ISS (Figure 3).  The United 
States is currently developing an automated transfer vehicle.
Unique flight tasks that are required before a flight/mission occurs 
serve to illustrate the vast complexity of the Implementation 
Verification, CoFR and Visiting Vehicle Operations phases. 
Moreover, because extensive reviews take place early on, along 
with in depth assessments being heavily embedded into flight 
products, several flight/missions appear to be performed without 
much complication. So in the public eye these tasks seem easy. 
However, though these tasks may seem to be conducted without 
complexity, several man-hours are poured into each flight product 
to ensure that tasks are performed correctly. For example, safety is 
a very important key aspect of these flight products and it greatly 
contributes to the reason that a flight/mission is carried out with 
great success. For instance, several phases and reviews are 
accomplished by several organizations that have a vested interest in 
the success of every flight/mission.  These organizations have 
several experts that are able to provide technical input and they also 
heavily weigh into the flight products at the beginning of the 
flight/mission planning stages. These organizations are also key 
players at ensuring that flight/missions are accomplished without 
failure. Therefore, successful flight/missions are carried out by the 
assistance of several expert organizations along with various safety 
organizations and they are the key reason that complex tasks are 
performed with great success.  
In order for any activity to materialize on orbit, it goes through a 
rigorous review process.  S&MA’s initial involvement in this 
process is the implementation verification phase.   Since hazards 
are common threats to the crewmembers on orbit, it is very 
important that flight products are adequately reviewed.  Flight 
products consist of procedures and flight rules.  Procedures are 
steps that instruct the crew on how to perform a specific task.  
Flight rules are directions to the Flight Control Team in Mission 
Control Center  on how to get the vehicle (ISS, shuttle, etc.) in a 
safe posture.  During this phase, S&MA verifies that any hazard 
controls associated with activities via flight products are properly 
implemented.   In order to condense the quantity of risks exposed 
by the crewmembers, controls are put in place.  Controls are 
defined as mitigation steps put in place to reduce risk.  The Ops 
team ensures that hazard controls are implemented within all  
flight products with a direct impact on safety.  With each product 
review, the Ops Engineers are able to provide an independent 
assessment on the validity of hazard control implementation.  So 
how does S&MA perform these complex verifications 
successfully?  Each Ops Engineer has to go through the following 
stages to perform these assessments properly:
1. Training
2. Tools
3. Feedback
Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR) is an assessment 
process that ensures adequate certification for flight activities 
performed by the NASA program.  This certification is based 
on the evaluation and disposition of various organizations’ 
endorsement codes.  Endorsement codes are utilized within the 
CoFR process to show that open work has been examined, the 
endorsement guarantees that all obligated work has been 
performed, and a signature from the appropriate organization is 
then gained by the ISS Program Office. However, before an 
endorsement signature is obtained, an assessment is conducted 
to ensure that a successful mission is completed without much 
complication.  As such, this assessment ensures operational 
readiness and the safety of the ISS on-orbit flight assembly 
operations. The assessment provides operations as well as other 
organizations with a look at open work that may impact the 
flight mission.  Moreover, several organizations take part in this 
assessment to certify that tasks, activities, and products related 
to endorsement statements have been accomplished [4].  The 
following are important factors involved in Operations Safety 
Assessments:
1. Hazard 
2. Controls
3. Weighing Risk
4. Mitigating Risk
5. Implementation
Figure 1. The 
International Space 
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Approximately eleven years ago, the International Space Station 
(Figure 1) launched its first m dul  from Russia, the Functional 
Cargo Block (FGB).  Safety and Mission A su ance (S&MA) 
Operations (Ops) Engi eers played an integral part of that 
endeavor by xecuting st ict flight product verification as w ll as 
continued staffing of S&MA’s console in the Mission Evaluation 
Room (MER) for that flight mission. How were these engineers 
able to conduct such a complicated task? They conducted it based 
on product verification that consisted f ensuring that safety 
requirements were ad quately contained in all flight products that 
affecte  cr w safety.  S&MA Ops Engineers apply both systems 
engineering and project management principles in order to gain an 
appropriate level of techn cal knowledge necessary to perform 
thorough reviews which cove  the subsyste (s) affected. They also 
ensured that   mission priorities were carried out with great detail 
and success. 
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